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	<title>Comments on: It’s a Cohmad Mad Mad World!</title>
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	<description>Occasional thoughts on financial markets and matters</description>
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		<title>By: Ted</title>
		<link>http://mehtafiscal.com/2009/02/24/cohmad-mad-mad-world/#comment-37</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[Ted]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 13 Mar 2009 16:51:33 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[Thanks for your article.  It shows more evidence that Peter Madoff can&#039;t use the &quot;I know nothing&quot; excuse, given he was a director at Cohmad Securities

The way to throw the other Madoffs, in prison, may be through the associates at Cohmad securities, especially if the Feds flip Marcia Cohn or Alvin Delaire.  

It also shows that there was no &quot;chinese wall&quot; between the market making side of the Investment Bank and the Advisory side of Madoff Securities Inc. There was much work for integration of the advisory business, the trading business and Cohmad Securities.  What is coming across is the amount of energy to juggle the books and play a shell game with regulators.   They did this by downplaying the amount of money they controlled.


The Feds should focused first on Cohmad principals sans Peter Madoff, and then get indictments on the remaining Madoff family.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>Thanks for your article.  It shows more evidence that Peter Madoff can&#8217;t use the &#8220;I know nothing&#8221; excuse, given he was a director at Cohmad Securities</p>
<p>The way to throw the other Madoffs, in prison, may be through the associates at Cohmad securities, especially if the Feds flip Marcia Cohn or Alvin Delaire.  </p>
<p>It also shows that there was no &#8220;chinese wall&#8221; between the market making side of the Investment Bank and the Advisory side of Madoff Securities Inc. There was much work for integration of the advisory business, the trading business and Cohmad Securities.  What is coming across is the amount of energy to juggle the books and play a shell game with regulators.   They did this by downplaying the amount of money they controlled.</p>
<p>The Feds should focused first on Cohmad principals sans Peter Madoff, and then get indictments on the remaining Madoff family.</p>
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		<title>By: FriendOfTheVictims</title>
		<link>http://mehtafiscal.com/2009/02/24/cohmad-mad-mad-world/#comment-34</link>
		<dc:creator><![CDATA[FriendOfTheVictims]]></dc:creator>
		<pubDate>Fri, 06 Mar 2009 01:37:08 +0000</pubDate>
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		<description><![CDATA[The documents posted by the Mass. securities division strongly suggest that Cohmad employees knew it was a Ponzi scheme. Exhibit 11 shows mostly positive but some negative amounts for individual client assets under management with each Registered Representative. Negative amounts clearly represent cases of clients who, based on their fictitious account statements, were able to cash out more than their original investments. The RR&#039;s were paid a given percentage of these total negative as well as positive amounts. To continue to be paid, an RR had to continually bring in new clients to offset the cash taken out by clients recruited earlier, the very hallmark of a Ponzi scheme.  Compensation obviously had nothing to do with the account values on statements sent to clients. The formula for the compensation paid to Cohmad RR&#039;s should  be enough to convict them for fraud.]]></description>
		<content:encoded><![CDATA[<p>The documents posted by the Mass. securities division strongly suggest that Cohmad employees knew it was a Ponzi scheme. Exhibit 11 shows mostly positive but some negative amounts for individual client assets under management with each Registered Representative. Negative amounts clearly represent cases of clients who, based on their fictitious account statements, were able to cash out more than their original investments. The RR&#8217;s were paid a given percentage of these total negative as well as positive amounts. To continue to be paid, an RR had to continually bring in new clients to offset the cash taken out by clients recruited earlier, the very hallmark of a Ponzi scheme.  Compensation obviously had nothing to do with the account values on statements sent to clients. The formula for the compensation paid to Cohmad RR&#8217;s should  be enough to convict them for fraud.</p>
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